Empire-Builders and Shirkers: Investment, Firm Performance, and Managerial Incentives by Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick












We thank Sheri Aggarwal, Patricia Anderson, George Baker, Espen Eckbo, Bob Gibbons, Charlie
Himmelberg, Glenn Hubbard, Dennis Logue, Richard Sansing, Marc Zenner, and seminar participants at
Columbia, Dartmouth, MIT, North Carolina, and Rochester for helpful comments. We also thank Sarah
Leonard for assistance with Compustat and Andy Halula for assistance with the ExecuComp database. Any
errors are our own.  The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 1999 by Rajesh K. Aggarwal and Andrew A. Samwick.  All rights reserved.  Short sections of text, not
to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including ©notice, is given to the source.
Empire-Builders and Shirkers:  
Investment, Firm Performance, and Managerial Incentives
Rajesh K. Aggarwal and Andrew A. Samwick
NBER Working Paper No. 7335
September 1999
JEL No. G3, J3
ABSTRACT
Do firms systematically over- or underinvest as a result of agency problems?  We develop a
contracting model between shareholders and managers in which managers have private benefits or private
costs of investment. Managers overinvest when they have private benefits and underinvest when they have
private costs. Optimal incentive contracts mitigate the over- or underinvestment problem. We derive
comparative static predictions for the equilibrium relationships between incentives from compensation,
investment, and firm performance for both cases. The relationship between firm performance and
managerial incentives, in isolation, is insufficient to identify whether
managers have private benefits or private costs of investment. In order to identify whether managers have
private benefits or costs, we estimate the joint relationships between incentives and firm performance and
between incentives and investment. Our empirical results show that both firm performance and investment
are increasing in managerial incentives. These results are consistent with managers having private costs of
investment. We find no support for overinvestment based on private benefits.
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In large corporations, owners delegate decisions such as investment, effortprovision, and resource
allocation to professional managers. These decisions are often unobservableor very costly for
the owners to monitor. Owners provide managers with incentives to induce themto take actions
that maximize the value of the firm. This separation of ownership and control is theclassic
principal-agent problem.
In this paper, we focus on the investment decisions of managers. Agency problems could lead
managers either to overinvest or underinvest.For example, Jensen (1986, 1993) argues that
managers take wasteful, negative net present value investment projects because they derive some
benefit from controlling more assets.This is overinvestment or empire-building. Conversely,
managers may forego some positive net present value investment projects. Investing requires the
manager to oversee the investment. Because managers in general prefer to work less (i.e., they
are inclined to shirk), managers will underinvest. The two different agency problems provide
dramatically different characterizations of firm behavior.
This paper makes three principal contributions.First, we provide a flexible and tractable
principal-agent model for analyzing investment decisions. We model managers as having either
private benefits or private costs of investment. We show that the optimal provision of incentives
through compensation can mitigate over- and underinvestment problems. The model delivers
clear, testable implications that can be used to identify whethermanagers have private benefits
or private costs of investment.
Second, we show that the existing evidence of overinvestment is not, in fact, sufficient to identify
the agency problem as one of overinvestmerjt. In an importantpaper, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1988) find that over a range of incentives, firm performance is declining in incentives. Theyargue
that this is because managers make investment decisions that serve to entrench them in theirjobs.
As a result, firms are overinvesting (see also Shleifer and Vishny (1989)). However,a finding that
firm performance is declining in incentives does not imply that firmsare overinvesting. Such a
finding can also be consistent with firms that are underinvesting. In order to identify whether the
agency problem is one of over- or underinvestment, we need to examine the relationship between
investment and incentives in addition to the relationship between firm performance and incentives.
1In general, it is not possible toassociate changes in firm performancewith changes in corporate
governance mechanism5_takeos,board size, capital structure,dividend policy, and incentives-
unless there is also a relationshipbetween changes in corporate governanceand the actions taken
by managers, such as investmentdecisions.
Third, we derive a unique equilibrium
for our model and test its comparativestatic predictions.
Empirically, we show that bothfirm performance and investment areincreasing in incentives.
These two results jointly imply
that overinvestment is not afeature of the data. Instead, these
findings are consistent withthe presence of underinvestmentthat is mitigated through the useof
optimal incentive contracts.
The idea that firms systematicallyoverinvest originated with Jensen(1986), who argues that
shareholders must find mechanismsto induce managers to disgorgefree cash flow rather than to
overinvest. Jensen focuses on the useof debt and dividends to force managersto pay out free cash
flow and considers the threat oftakeover as a disciplinary device.A number of authors, including
Stulz (1990), Hart and Moore (1995),
Zwiebel (1996), and Chang (1993),have formalized Jensen's
argument.
The relationship between firm performance
and managerial ownership has beenused to support
the overinvestment model. Morck,Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) estimate anonmonotonic piecewise
linear relationship between
managerial ownership and firm performance.They find that firm
performance is declining inownership for ownership levelsbetween 5 and 25 percent ofthe firm.
They interpret their result asevidence that managers becomeentrenched in their positions for
ownership in this range. As aresult of entrenchment, managers consume
perquisites or overinvest,
lowering firm performance. Manysubsequent papers (Mcconnelland Servaes (1990), immelberg,
Hubbard, and Palia (1999), andPalia (1998)) have conductedsimilar analyses, with mixedresults.
Other support for overinvestmentcomes from Jensen (1993),who provides illustrativecalcula-
tions of the destruction ofshareholder value at a number ofthe world's largest corporations.He
argues that these firmswould have generated much morevalue had they returned cashto their
shareholders rather than investedin projects that turned out tobe negative net presentvalue.
Kaplan (1989) analyzes changesin firm value, profitability and
capital expenditures in a sampleof
seventy-six management buyoutsat large public companies.
He argues that management buyouts
2result in improved incentives. His results show that profitabilityincreases and capital expendi-
tures decrease after the buyouts. Other evidence ofoverinvestment is anecdotal in nature. For
example, Burrough and Helyar (1990, p. 95) describehow managers at RJR Nabisco squandered
shareholders' cash on corporate jet rides for dogs and celebrity golftournaments.1
A number of models predict that firms will underinvest. Reasonsfor underinvestment include
high leverage (Myers (1977)), dividend signaling (Millerand Rock (1985)), and more general
asymmetric information between firms and capitalmarkets (Myers and Majluf (1984)). Our un-
derinvestment model is based on principal-agent considerations—investing maybe personally costly
for managers because managers have to oversee the investmentsthat their firms make.
Existing empirical support for underinvestment comesfrom several sources. McConnell and
Muscarella (1985) show that firm stock prices react positively toannouncements of increases
in capital expenditures. Poterba and Summers (1995) showthat firms systematically evaluate
investment projects using hurdle rates that exceed the firms' costsof capital. They argue that
CEOs of firms in the U.S. have short capital budgeting timehorizons. Poterba and Summers
(1995) conclude that firms forego long-term, positive net presentvalue investment projects. Both
of these studies imply that firms could invest more and increasedollar returns to shareholders.2
We provide an alternative model of investment based on agency concerns.In our model,
managers choose the level of investmentand have either private benefits or private costs of invest-
ment. The first case we consider is that managers derive privatebenefits from investment, so that
their utility is increasing in the level of investment. Managers are empire-buildersand continue to
choose investment projects even after all positive net presentvalue investments have been taken.
The second case is that investment is costly for managers. The disutilityof investment comes
from bearing oversight responsibilities for that investment. For example,when firms expand ex-
isting facilities or start new product lines, managers are requiredto do more work. Managers will
forego some positive net present value investments inorder to lessen the amount of work that they
have to do. Given these assumptions, managers will overinvestin the first case and underinvest
i A different strand ol theempiricalliterature looks for evidence of overinvestment in corporatediversification and
finds evidence of less diversification in firms with higher managerial equityownership (see, for example, Deois,
Denis, and Sarin (1997)).
2 The sensitivity of investment to cash flow,first documented by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), also
suggests that investment systematically differs from its optimallevel. Hadlock (1998) demonstrates empirically
that this sensitivity rises with ownership, which he argues is inconsistentwith overinvestment.
3in the second case. The two cases reflect very different perspectives on corporate investment and
managerial behavior.
We focus on incentives provided by tying managers' compensation to the performance of their
firms. The optimal contract for the manager ameliorates the overinvestment and underinvestment
problems. We show how the optimal contract depends on the manager's risk aversion, the variance
of firm performance, and the magnitude of the private benefits or costs associated with investment.
We then estimate how performance and investment vary with changes in incentives, given changes
in the underlying exogenous parameters.
In our model, we assume that the firm has sufficient funds to undertake all investment projects
selected by the managers.In this sense, the firm is potentially subject to a free cash flow
problem. Other studies have noted that debt, dividends, hostile takeovers, product and factor
market competition, and board intervention are mechanisms that could be used to overcome a free
cash flow problem. Compared to these other mechanisms, incentives can be adjusted frequently
and inexpensively, and, when adjusted, they can be targeted precisely for themanagers. Incentives
from compensation should be the primary mechanism to influence managerial behavior.
Our results highlight the importance of investment. In order to differentiate between over-
and underinvestment, we need to examine how both investment and firm performance respond to
changes in incentives in equilibrium. If investment and firm performance both increase or both
decrease in incentives, this supports the private costs model and rejects the private benefits model.
If investment and firm performance move in opposite directions with changes in incentives, this
supports the private benefits model and rejects the private costs model.
To conduct our empirical work, we use data on managerial incentives from Standard and
Poor's ExecuComp dataset. Our sample consists of comprehensive data for the top five executives
(ranked annually by salary and bonus) from the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmaliCap
600 companies from 1993 to 1997. We use investment and firm performance data from Compustat.
Empirically, we find that both investment and firm performance are increasing in incentives.
These findings are robust to the inclusion of firm-level fixed effects and other factors that could
affect the level of investment and firm performance. These results support a model in which firms
underinvest. Our results also suggest that the underlying sources of variation within and across
4firms are managerial risk aversion
and the variance of firm performance.We find no support for
models based on private benefitsof investment. Intuitively,
there cannot be an overinvestment
problem due to agency concernsif greater incentives areassociated with better firm performance
andhigherinvestment.
One of our empirical resultsis of independent interest
from overinvestment and underinvest-
ment problems. We find clear,systematic evidence thatfirm performance is increasingin incen-
tives.This result is in contrast tothe results in studies such asMorck, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1988) and immelberg,Hubbard, and Palia (1999),which do not find a monotonicallyincreas-
ing relationship between
performance and incentives.Although these studies do notdraw this
conclusion, their results rejectstandard principal-agent models
such as Holmstrom (1979) and
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987),which predict that performancewill be increasing in incentives
in equilibrium. The standard
principal-agent models aredifferent from ours in that theyfocus
on effort, not investment.Nonetheless, our finding that performance
is increasing in incentives
provides additional supportfor the standard models.
The remainder of the paperis organized as follows. InSection 2, we present the principal-
agent model in which managershave either private benefits orcosts of investment. In Section3,
we describe our data onincentives, firm performance,and investment. The econometricresults
are presented in Section4. Section 5 concludes.
2. Theoretical Resultsand PredictioflS
In this section, we show howincentives are deterned if managershave either private benefits
or private costs of investment.We also show how incentives,investment, and firm performance
are related in equilibrium.Changes in these equilibriumoutcomes are driven by changesin the
underlying parameters of the
0el—managerial risk aversion, thevariance of firm performance
and the magnitude of private
benefits or costs of investment.Our model illustrates two keypoints.
First, focusing oily on the responseof firm performance to incentives
is insufficient to idefltif)T
whether there is overinvestment orunderinvestment. In equilibrium,firm performance could be
declining in incentives evenif the managers face private
costs of investment and henceunderinvest.
Studies such as Morck, Shleifer,and Vishny (1988) have interpreted
a declining relationshipas
evidence of overinvestment.Similarly, performance could
be increasing in incentives evenif the
5managers have private benefitsof investment and hence overinvest.
Second, examining the joint responseof firm performance and investment toincentives is suf-
ficient to identify whether there isoverinvestment or underinvestment. For example,if both
performance and investment areincreasing in incentives, then in equilibriumthe firm is under-
investing. Similarly, if investment isincreasing in incentives and firm performanceis decreasing
in incentives, then in equilibrium thefirm is overinvesting. We derive afull set of results in a
tractable principal-agent model of investment.
2.1 The Model
We consider a principal-agent setting inwhich managers choose investments..The firm is assumed
to have sufficient free cash flow tofund all investment projects the managerwishes to undertake.
We assume that firm profits net of theamount invested are:
ir=mI_I2+g
(1)
where I is the level of investment, in parameterizes
how productive the firm's investment is,and
gisa normally distributed shock to profitswith a mean of zero and a variance ofa2. Returns are
concave in investment—there arediminishing returns to investing. In theabsence of any principal-
agent problem, the optimal levelof investment is given by the firstorder condition to equation
(1):
I°=rn. (2)
The optimal level of investment isdetermined only by the productivity ofinvestment—firms that
are more productive invest more.
The principal employs an agent who chooses
an unobservable level of investment,or a level of
investment that is observable but notverifiable.While shareholders could potentiallymonitor
managers' investment choices, doing sois costly.Monitoring is particularlY costly in large,
publicly traded corporations inwhich ownership is dispersed. Analternative interpretation is
that the productivity of investment inis unobservable. In this case, investmentis observable, but
the principal does not know if the agenthas chosen the right level of investment.The important
point for our model is that we assumethat investment is not contractible.
6The agent has negative exponential utility with a coefficient of absolute risk aversion of r. The
agent receives a wage contract that is linear in firm performance:
w—wo+air. (3)
The agent receives a fixed wage component (salary) of w0 and a performance-based component
of air. In this setting, the agent's pay-performance sensitivity is a. We can also interpret the
previous equation as a statement about the agent's wealth.If we assume, as is true of most
executives, that a large fraction of their wealth is invested in their own firms, then w0 is the
component of wealth that is independent of the firm and air is the component of weahh that
depends on firm performance. In this case, a represents executive ownership in the firm.
We allow for either nonpecuniary private costs or benefits of investing for managers. Following
Stulz (1990),weassume that the manager derives linearly increasing benefits or costs of the
form BI from investing more. If B >0,then every dollar of investment generates a marginal B
dollars of utility for the manager. The manager enjoys private benefits from more investment or,
equivalently, managing a larger firm (empire-building). If B <0,then the manager incurs costs
of investing. These take the form of oversight costs associated with greater investment. The more
the manager invests, the more work the manager must do to actually manage the investment.
Working is costly for the manager (B <0),so the manager must be given incentives (a) in order
to invest more.
The principal's problem is to maximize expected profits net of compensation for the agent,
given that the agent will choose the level of investment to maximize her utility. The principal's
program is:
max EQr) —w
s.t. E [i4w + BI)] ￿ ii(IR) (4)
I E argmaxj B [u(w + BI)] (IC).
The first constraint is the agent's individual rationality (Ia) constraint where iiisthe agent's reser-
vation utility. The second constraint is the agent's incentive compatibility constraint (IC), which
requires that the agent choose the level of investment optimally (for her) given the compensation
contract. The agent's certainty equivalent from a contract vi is given by:
u=wo+a(mI_I2)+BI_a2c2,
(5)
7where a2c2 represents the cost of the agent's risk aversion.
The manager chooses the investment level to maximize her certainty equivalent (5). This level
of investment is:
B 1=m+—. (6) a
When compared to the optimal level of investment in the absence of agency problems (1° = in),
we notice two things. First, the level of investment chosen by the manager is distorted by B, her
private benefits or costs of investment. If the manager has private benefits (B > 0), the manager
will overinvest, P > I". If the manager has private costs (B <0), the manager will underinvest,
1 C1°.Second, the amount of over- or underinvestment is attenuated by incentives, a. The
greater is a, the closer the manager's choice of investment will be to the level that is optimal in
the absence of agency problems. This is true for both private benefits and private costs.
The principal's problem is to maximize net profits given the agent's choice of investment.
Expected profits net of compensation for the agent are:
E[_w=mI_I2+BI_a2c2_1i (7)
Here we assume that the managerial labor market is competitive, so that the agent is held to her
reservation utility through the choice of w0. Substituting the agent's choice of investment into
the above expected net profit equation and maximizing with respect to a yields the following first
order condition:
(—ra2a —B2a+ B2) =0. (8)
The first order condition defines an optimal contract as (the second order condition is satisfied
as well). There exists a unique optimal contract, and this contract is on the interval (0, 1). To
see this, note that because the function —ra2a4 —B2a+ B2 is polynomial, it is continuous in
a. As a —0,the function is positive. At a = 1, the function is negative. Therefore, there
exists a root on (0, 1). By Descartes' rule of signs, there is at most one real root to the equation
—B2a+ B2 =0,thus proving uniqueness.
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Equations (9) and (10) are an
immediate consequence of assumingthat managers are risk averse.
The optimal weight on firm performance,
a*, declines as risk aversionincreases or the variance of
the performance measure increasesbecause shareholders musttrade off incentives versus insurance
for the managers. Equation (11)
shows that & increases as amanager's private benefits become
larger and that & decreases asa manager's privatecosts become smaller in magnitude.The
intuition for these results is thatincentives are used to counteractthe manager's private benefits
or costs. If private benefits orcosts increase (in absolute value),
the manager must be given more
incentives. If private benefits orcosts decrease (in absolutevalue), the manager can be given
fewer incentives. Note that& does not depend on theproductivity of investment, m.As a
result, changes in m do notaffect investment or profits throughchanges in incentives. Asshown
in equations (6) and (7), changesin indohave direct effects on investmentand net profits, even
though incentives are unaffected.
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a,b) show that j4<0is strongly supported empirically.This
comparative static result showsthat agents' will have weakerincentives the larger the variance
of the performance measure. In
those papers, we show that managersat firms with the largest
variances of stock returns have payperformance
sensitivities that are an order of magnitudesmaller
than managers at firms with thesmallest variances of stock returns.This result supports a general
principal-agent framework,but the unanswered questionis which principal-agent model—private
benefits or private costs? Equation
(10) points out that the finding4< 0is consistent with
both principal-agent models
developed here. Because the manageris risk averse, greater variance
of shocks will always lead tolower powered incentives.
Therefore, our finding of<0is
insufficient to identify which ofthe two principal-agent models
is generating the data (if either).
In order to distinguish the two
models based on the determinantsof a, we would need to
observe whether B is positive.If managers have privatebenefits (B >0)and we find that
>0,then this would constitute strongsuppo for the modelsbased on private benefits of
9investment. Conversely, if managershave private benefits and wefind that jij <0, then we
know that the model, at leastin its basic form, is wrong.
Unfortunately, B is unobservable in a
large cross-section of firms.
We can reliably observe iv,I,and a in a large panel of firms.In order to test the theory, we
therefore derive comparative static
predictions of how thesethree outcomes will change as the
underlying parameters r,B,and c2 vary across firms and overtime. In our model, a larger
B in absolute value means thatthe shareholders are confrontedwith a larger agency problem.
Managers with larger valuesof B will require greater incentivesto mitigate their agency behavior.
For a given B, lower values of rora2 will allow shareholders to provide higherpowered incentives.
We focus on how investment and
firm performance are affected bythese incentives in equilibrium.
The predictions that we willtest are summarized in Table1. Testing these predictionsallows
us to infer whether managershave private benefits or privatecosts of investment; that is, we can
infer the sign of B.
2.2 Investment andIncentives
We start with the investment predictions.The optimal afromequation (8) is a function
of the exogenous parameters r,a2,and B. We take the derivativeof P with respect to the
exogenous parametersand then demonstrate how 1varies with a given a change inthe exogenous
parameter. Consider firstthe manager's risk aversion.The optimal level of investmentfrom
equation (6) changes due torisk aversion only through theeffect of risk aversion on incentivesa5:
B 3a5 12
&r (a)25r
Becauseoptimal incentives decrease asrisk aversion increases ($C 0),if the manager has
private benefits of investment(B >0), investmentincreasesasrisk aversion increases. The
intuition is that increasing risk
aversion lowers incentives so as toinsulate the manager from risk.
But incentives are what constrainthe manager's overinvestment.
As incentives decrease, the
manager invests more.If the manager has privatecosts (B <0),investment decreases as risk
aversion increases. The manageragain has lower incentives,but in this case lower incentives
reduce investment. Fewer incentivesinduce the manager to underinvesteven more.
10Dividing both sides of equation(12) by £$whileholding cr2 and Bconstantyields:
or B (13)
This expression relates the optimallevel of investment to the optimalamount of incentives given
a change in risk aversion.For B>0, <0. The manager is overinvestingand an increase in
incentives due to a reduction inrisk aversion lowers thisoverinvestment. For B< 0,>0.
The manager is derinvestingand an increase in incentivesdue to a reduction in risk aversion
increases investment, therebyreducing underinvestment.
Next consider the variance offirm performance, a2. If we replacerwith2 in the above
derivation (equations 12, 13) andhold randBconstant,we get similar results.The intuition is
identical. Increasing the exogenousvariance of firm performance
lowers incentives so as to insulate
the manager from risk. In the caseof private benefits, lower incentivesincrease overinvestment.
In the case of private costs, lower
incentives decrease the level ofinvestment, thereby increasing
underinvestment. These predictions are
reported in the second andfourth columns of the top
row of Table 1.
Now consider the private benefits orcosts of investment, B.Theoptimal level of investment




The first effect in equation (14)is the direct effect of a changein private benefits on thelevel of
investment itself. If the managerderives more benefits from investing,the manager will increase
the level of investment. Thesecond effect in equation (14)is due to the effect of privatebenefits
on incentives. Shareholders
will increase incentives to offsetthe manager's propensity toinvest
more. Because increasingincentives is costly for shareholders,the increase in incentiveswill not
fully offset the higher investmentdue to the manager's greater private
benefits. The intuition is
the same for a change in the privatecosts of investment.
Dividing equation (14) through byfAwhileholding a2 and rconstantyields:
01* 11 B 12_as (15)
0a5a (a)22 (cf)2 (1 —a)
where we have used equations (8)and (11) to simplify the expression.This equation relates
the optimal level of investmentto the optimal amount ofincentives given a change in private
11benefits or costs of investment. For B>0, ff9>0. If there are private benefits, an increase in
incentives is associated with an increase in investment. This result may seem paradoxical. The
manager is overinvesting, and yet the increase in incentives seems to increase this overinvestment.
However, incentives are not an exogenous variable that determine investment. The increases in
incentives arid investment are both equilibrium responses to the manager's higher private benefits.
Although incentives increase in response to the increase in private benefits, incentives do not
increase sufficiently to prevent the manager from overinvesting more. This prediction is exactly in
line with the intuition from the entrenchment literature. In that literature, managers with higher
incentives (ownership) engage in more wasteful activities (overinvest) because their ownership
entrenches them. Here we give an optimal contracting and equilibrium interpretation to the
entrenchment intuition.
For B<0, 9C0. If there are private costs, an increase itt incentives is associated with
a decrease in investment. The intuition is similar to the private benefits case. As B becomes
more negative, the manager has more private costs and so the amount of incentives a that are
optimally provided to the manager increases. Although incentives increase to offset the greater
private costs, incentives do not increase sufficiently to prevent the manager from investing even
less, thereby increasing miderinvestment. These results are reported in the second and fourth
columns of the bottom row of Table 1.
2.3 Firm Performance and Incentives
Now we turn to the profit predictions. Recall from equation (1) that it= ml—I2+ e. It is
clear that profits depend on the exogenous parameters r, a2, and B only through their impact
on investment I. We take the derivative of itwithrespect to the exogenous parameters and
then show how itvarieswith a*, given a change in the exogenous parameter. For any exogenous
parameter, x, where it{r, a2, B}:
(16)
Dividing both sides by j9whileholding the other parameters constant yields:
BOI
(17) 3cxaOa*
12Equation (17) shows that the sign of jdependson the sign of B and the sign of .If
managers have private benefits, B is positive andwill have the opposite sign of -g-.Ifthe
firm is already overinvesting and investment increases, profits will decrease.If managers have
private costs, B is negative andwill have the same sign as g.Ifthe firm is underinvesting
and investment increases, profits will increase.
First, consider changes in rando2.Increasesin risk aversion or the variance of firm per-
formance reduce incentives. If there are private benefits, reduced incentives increase investment,
thereby reducing firm profits. Therefore, the reduction in incentives is associated with a reduction
in profits, or>0.If there are private costs, reduced incentives decrease investment, thereby
reducing firm profits.Therefore, the reduction in incentives is associated with a reduction in
profits, or > 0. Both the private benefits and private costs models yield the prediction that
firm performance is increasing in incentives if the underlying source of exogenous variation is risk
aversion or the variance of firm performance. These results are reported in the first and third
columns of the top row of Table 1.
Next consider changes in the magnitude of private benefits or costs of investment. If there
are private benefits of investment, an increase in those private benefits leads, in equilibrium, to
an increase in incentives. However, the increase in incentives does not fully offset the higher
investment due to higher private benefits, so the level of investment increases.Because the
manager is overinvesting, the increase in investment decreases firm performance.Therefore,
higher incentives will be associated with lower firm performance. This is the most prominent
feature of stories of managerial entrenchment. Similarly, if there are private costs of investment,
an increase in the absolute value of private costs leads, in equilibrium, to an increase in incentives
and a reduction in investment. Because the manager is underinvesting, the decrease in investment
decreases firm performance.Therefore, higher incentives will be associated with lower firm
performance. Both the private benefits and private costs models yield the prediction that firm
performance is decreasing in incentives if the underlying source of exogenous variation is the
magnitude of the private benefits or costs. These results are reported in the first and third
columns of the bottom row of Table 1.
Studies in the entrenchment literature typically focus on the reduced form relationship between
13firm performance and ownership. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) find a negative relationship
over an intermediate range of the data and view this result as support for the entrenchment
hypothesis and overinvestment. Our comparative statics results show that this conclusion is not
warranted. A finding that firm performance decreases in incentives is not sufficient to conclude
that there are private benefits rather than private costs. Such a finding is also consistent with the
private costs model (where there is no entrenchment) when the underlying source of variation is
the magnitude of those private costs.
2.4 Summary
Table 1 summarizes the predictions between firm performance and investment and incentives,
which are observable in our data.According to the theory, differences in firm performance,
investment, and incentives must be the result of differences in the three underlying parameters—
risk aversion, the variance of firm performance, or private benefits or costs.
First, consider the predictions for firm performance (the first and third columns). Finding
that firm performance is increasing in incentives is consistent with both the private benefits and
private costs models if the underlying source of variation is risk aversion or the variance of firm
performance. Similarly, finding that firm performance is decreasing in incentives is consistent
with both models if the underlying source of variation is in the magnitude of the private benefits
or costs.Analyzing the relationship between firm performance and incentives in isolation is
insufficient to determine whether managers face private benefits or private costs of investment.
Second, consider the predictions for investment (the second and fourth columns). Finding
that investment increases with incentives would be consistent with the private costs model if the
underlying source of variation is risk aversion or the variance of firm performance. A finding that
investment increases with incentives would also be consistent with the private benefits model if
the underlying source of variation is the magnitude of the private benefits. Conversely, a finding
that investment decreases with incentives would be consistent with the private costs model if the
underlying source of variation is the magnitude of the private costs. It would also be consistent
with the private benefits model if the underlying source of variation is risk aversion or the variance
of firm performance.
Using both the investment predictions and the firm performance predictions will allow us
14to identify which model is generating the data. Table 1 shows that each of thefour possible
combinations of the signs of the derivatives will identify a model and a source of exogenous
variation. If performance and investment move in the same direction given a change in incentives,
then the correct model is private costs. If performance and investment move in opposite directions
given a change in incentives, then the correct model is privatebenefits. When we empirically
examine these relationships, finding, for example, that investment increases with incentives and
firm performance increases with incentives would rule out the private benefits model and suggest
that either risk aversion or the variance of firm performance is the source of variation.These
comparative static predictions are what we test.
3.Data
Thissection describes the data sources that we use to test the comparative static predictions of our
principal-agent modeL We use Standard and Poor's ExecuComp dataset to construct our measure
of managerial incentives. ExecuComp contains data on all aspects of compensation forthe top
five executives (ranked annually by salary and bonus) at each of the firms in the S&P 500,S&P
Midcap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600. Due to enhanced federal reporting requirementsfor fiscal
years ending after December 15, 1992, we can measureincentives from 1993 to 1997. Financial
and operating data for the ExecuComp sample companies are drawn from the Compustatdataset.
Monthly measures of stock returns from the Center for Research on SecurityPrices (CRSP) are
utilized in calculations of the variance of returns.
Managers can receive pay-performance incentives from a variety of sources.The vast majority
of these incentives are due to ownership of stock and stock options. Jensen and Murphy (1990)
carefully aggregate pay-performance incentives into a single pay-performance sensitivity.They
find that the typical CEO receives approximately $3.25 of compensation perthousand dollar
increase in shareholder wealth. Of this amount, $2.50 is due to the median CEO's holdingsof
stock in the firm and $0.15 is due to ownership of stock options. Increases inthe present value
of current and future compensation and decreases in the probability of dismissal are responsible
for $0.30 each. Hall and Liebman (1998) show that incentives from stock and particularlystock
The ExecuComp data are collected directly from the companies' proxy statements andrelated filings with the
Securities Exchange Commission. Our analysis in this paper uses data from the October 1998release of the data.
See Standard and Poor's (1995) for further documentation.
15options have grown
substantiallY since the sample periodused by Jensen and Murphy (1990).
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a)show that incentives fromstock and options are roughly twenty
times more important than
aual compensation as a sourceof incentives for both CEOsand
other top managers. Thus, ouruse of payperformance
sensitivities based on stock and option
ownership captures the bulkof total incentives. Muchof the managerial entrenchmentliterature
has focused on incentives fromstock ownership. Our measureof incentives is more inclusive in
that it also covers options.For this reason, we call ourexplanatoly variable "PPS"rather than
"ownership." It is a more comprehensive
measure of incentives.
ExecuComp contains precisedata on executives' holdingsof stock in their own companiesand
grants of options duringthe current year. For stock,the payperformance sensitivityis simply the
fraction of the firm that theexecutive owns. A CEO whoholds 3 percent of the stock0utstanding
in her firm will receive $30 perthousand dollar change inshareholder wealth. For options,the
payperformance sensitivityis the fraction of the firm'sstock on which the options areitten
multiplied by the options' deltas.
For options granted in thecurrent year, companies mustreport the number ofsecurities, the
exercise price, and the exercisedate. Following Standardand Poor's (1995), we assumethat
options will be exercised80 percent (up to 1994) or70 percent (1995 and later)through their
term, which is usually10 years. We use thecorresponding 8 and 7 year zero-couponTreasury
bond rates as the risk-free ratesof return. The risk-freeinterest rates used for 1992through
1997 are 7.19, 5.86, 7.17, 6.50,6.30, and 6.29 percent,respectively. In applyg theBlack-Scholes
formula, we use the dividend yieldfor the company reported by
ExecuComp and calculate the
standard deviation of monthlystock returns for each companyusing data from CRSP.We use
up to five years of priormonthly returns to computevariances. If a firm did nothave at least
twelve prior monthly returnsfor a given year, we impute
the variance.4 We multiplythis value
by to get the standard deviationof continuously compoundedannual returns (volatility).
For options granted in previous years,
the proxy statement reportsonly the aggregate number
of securities and the aggregate
"intrinsic value" of the optionsthat are in the money.The intrinsic
value of each option is thestock price at the end of thefiscal year less the option'sexercise price.
For firms that were missingdar1an for some years, we usethe variance of the nextavailable year's
returns. For firms that had
missing data on variance in all years,we use the ssmple's averagevariance in each
year. Omitting theseobservations does not significantlychange our results.
16Following Murphy (1998), we
treat all existing options as a
single grant with a five yearremaining
term and an exercise pricesuch that the intrinsicvalue of all options is equal tothat reported on
the proxy statement. Apartfrom having to imputethe exercise price and yearsremaining until
exercise, the methodolofor options anted in previous
years is the same asfor current option
grants.
We exploit ExecuComP's
sampling frame and examinethe incentives to the top management
team. CEO status is reporteddirectly in ExecuComPand pertains to the executivewho held that
position for the majorityof the year. The payperformance
sensitivity for the top management
team is defined as thePPS for the CEO plus fourtimes the average PPSof the other executives
at the firm whose informationis reported in a given year.This convention standardizesthe size
of the team at five for allfirms even if data are missingfor some executives or morethan five
executives are reported in a given year.
The first two rows of Table2 present descriptivestatistics on the payperformaneasensitivities
of the top management team
and the CEO for the &msin our sample. The mean topmanagement
team has a combined payperforma1
5ensitivity equal to 6.76 percentof the firm. The interpre-
tation of this number is thatif the value of shareholderwealth increased by $1000 overthe course
of a year, then the valueof the stock and optionholdings of the top managementteam would
increase by $67.60. Thedistribution of management
incentives across firms isskewed to the right,
with median incentives
5bstantially lower at 2.93 percent.The CEO of each firm hasincentives
of 3.89 percent of the firmat the mean and 1.23 percentat the median. Otherpercentiles of the
distributions are also reported,showing considerablevariation in incentives inthe ExecuComp
sample.
The next two rows of Table2 pert aln to the o dependent
variables that we use in ouranalysis,
Tobin's QandInvestment, both of whià arecalculated from Compustat.Tobin's Qisequal to
the ratio of the sum of themarket value of equity andthe book lue of debt tothe book value of
assets. Qiscommonly used as a measureof firm profitability and performance
(Morck, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1988), McCounelland Ses (1990), and
immelberg, Hubbard, andPalia (1999)).
Our calculation reflects averageQandabstracts from the effectof taxes on firm lue.In our
sample, the mean andmedian values of Qare2.00 and 1.57, respectively.The middle 80 percent
17of the firms have Q values
between 1.06 and 3.34.Investment is equal to capitalexpenditures
for property, plant, and
equipment divided bythe stock of net property, plant,and equipment.
Investment rates are 24 percentat the mean and 20 percentat the median. Ten percentof the
firms invest less than 7.8 percentand ten percent invest morethan 46.5 percent.
The remainder of Table 2 presentsthe descriptive statistics
for other variables that wecontrol
for in our econometric
specifications for Q orInvestment. We include thenatural log of sales
to account for differencesin firm size. We alsoinclude the ratio of capital (netproperty, plant,
and equipment) to sales tocontrol for asset turnover.In the regressions presentedbelow, we
also include the squaresof these two variables.We include the ratio ofcash flow to capital
because many studies based onthe work of Fazzari, Hubbard,and Petersen (1988) haveshown
a relationshipbetween cash flow andinvestment. The effect of leverageis captured by the ratio
of long-term debt to assets.We include the standarddeviation of dollar returns toshareholders
(calculated from CRSP, asdescribed above) to account
for the effect of risk on profitabilityand
investment. Finally, we include
controls for the ratio ofresearch and development tocapital and
advertising to capital.5
We restrict our sample tothose firm-years in whichteam pay-performancesensitivity, invest-
ment, and Q can beconstructed. Within that sampleof 5665 firm-years for1494 firms, the last
four variables are missing
for several hundred or more
observations, as shown inthe first column of
Table 2. In the empirical
work below, we set thevalues of these variables to zerofor observations
where they are missing andinclude a dummy variable
for whether the data wereoriginally missing.
4. EmpiricalResults
We begin by examiningthe effect of managerial
incentives on both Tobin's Qand Investment.
For ease of exposition, wefirst present our resultswithout controlling for thefull set of covariates
found in Table 2.
4.1 Performanceand Incentives—InitialResults
Our model predicts aneqthlibrium relationship
between firm performanceand managerial incen-
tives. In the data, theobserved relationshipbetween performance and
incentives need not be
These variables are the samecontrol varLables used byHimmelberg, Hubbard, andPalia (1999).
18linear or even monotonic. We choose an
empirical specification that is flexibleenough to allow
for these possibilities. We estimate apiecewise linear specification inwhich the bendpoints cor-
respond to the quartiles of the distribution. Table 2 reports that themedian PPS is 2.9281,
with first and third quartiles of 1.0114and 7.5885, respectivelY. The piecewiselinear specifica-
tion generates a continuous relationshipbetween firm performance and managerialincentives that
consists of four segments. Each segment canhave a different slope, and the slopeof any segment
can be positive or negative.We estimate a spline regressionof the following form:
Qt = + $1PPS1t + fi2PPS2t+ 3PPS3ii + 4PPS4 +Ut + x + (18)
t=94
Ia this equation, the dependentvariable is Tobin's Q.Thefour PPS terms are the increments
to payperformance incentives alongeach segment. The coefficients onthe PPS terms correspond
to the slopes of the segments ineach of the four quartiles of thedata.6 The estimated relationship
between Tobin's Qandmanagerial incentives will bemonotonic only if all four coefficients onthe
PPS terms have the same sign.Therefore, this specification allowsfor nonmonotonicities to
appear if they are in factthe best description of the data.The specification also includes year
effects, denoted by G, and firmlevel fixed effects, denoted by )q.
Table 3 presents the econometricestimates of the parameters in equation(18). The OLS
estimates of the coefficients are presentedin the first column. These resultsomit the fixed effects.
The coefficients on the four PPS terms areestimated to be positive. The slopes aresmaller in
magnitude at higher levels of thePPS. The slopes of the first three segments,corresponding to
the bottom 75 percent of the data, aresignificantly different from zero.The slope of the top
segment is insignificantly differentfrom zero. The second columnof Table 3 presents the fixed
effects results. As in the OLS regression,the coefficients on the four PPS termsare estimated to
be positive, and the slopes are lowerat higher levels of the PPS. Inthe fixed effects regression,
the slopes of all segments are significantly
different from zero at the 5 percentlevel. The bottom
two rows of the table report the p-values
for two tests. The first is that thefour PPS coefficients
6 Denoting paypeH







19are jointly equal to zero. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, thew Tobin's Qisunrelated to
managerial incentives. The second is that the four PPS coefficients are jointly equal to each other.
This is a test for linearity.If the null hypothesis is not rejected, then the relationship between
Tobin's Qandmanagerial incentives is linear. Both null hypotheses are rejected for both the
OLS and fixed effect specifications.
Observed changes in managerial incentives and firm performance are equilibrium responses
to changes in exogenous parameters. Therefore, the coefficients on the PPS terms in Table 3
donot representthe marginal effect of an exogenous change in managerial incentives on firm
performance. For example, the slope coefficient on the first segment in the fixed effect regression
is 0.2387. Suppose that the top management team at a given firm is observed to have incentives
of 0.25 percent in the form of stock and options. Increasing this team's incentives to 0.75 percent
will not increase the value of Tobin's Qby(0.75—0.25)*0.2387 =0.1193.Managerial incentives of
0.25 percent are set in equilibrium, based on the exogenous parameters r,cr2, andB.Increasing
managerial incentives from the optimal level of 0.25 percent will lower the returns to shareholders
at this firm.7Instead, the coefficient of 0.2387 implies that at a firm in which it was optimal to
set managerial incentives to 0.25 percent, Tobin's Qisexpected to be 0.1193 lower than at a firm
in which it was optimal to set managerial incentives to 0.75 percent. The values of exogenous
parameters vary across firms and within firms over time. The firm in which managerial incentives
of 0.75 percent are optimal either has lower variance of firm performance or has managers with
lower risk aversion. Differences in the underlying parameters generate the observed variation in
both incentives and firm performance.
The fixed effects regression provides a more robust test of the comparative statics predictions
of the model. Including a dummy variable for each firm removes the effect of any firm-specific
characteristic that may affect both performance and incentives in a way not specified by our modeL
The fixed effects regression establishes a relationship between performance and incentives based
only on changes within firms over time. The OLS regression establishes a relationship between
performance and incentives based on comparisons both within and across firms. If firms are not
When incentives are set optimally, shareholders have traded off the benefits of reduced agency problems against
the cost of compensating the manager. Higher-than-optimal incentives inefficiently expose managers to risk, deprive
them of private benefits of investment, or force them to incur private costs of greater investment. Shareholders
must then compensate managers for these added burdens, thereby lowering shareholders' returns relative to the
optimum.
20otherwise identical, the OLS regression will be biased by unobserved, firm-specific factors whereas
the fixed effect regression will not. Comparing the 112fromthe two regressions, the inclusion
of the fixed effects absorbs a substantial amount of the variation (increasing the proportion of
variance explained from 0.0474 to 0.8475),butthe fixed effects do not change the basic shape of
the predicted relationship. The differences between the OLS and fixed effect regressions are shown
in Figure 1. The plot consists of the predicted values for each regression using the intercept for
the 1993 sample year. The values from the fixed effect regression have a higher intercept, a lower
initial slope, but a more modest decline in slopes thereafter. Overall, the two graphs are quite
similar. To the extent that there are unobserved, firm-specific factors that determine Tobin's Q,
theydo not appear to be highly correlated with managerial incentives in our data.
There are two important features of our findings on the relationship between Tobin's Qand
managerial incentives. The first is that in neither regression do we find an intermediate range
of incentives over which Tobin's Qdecreaseswith higher levels of the PPS. This contrasts with
the earliest papers that investigated this relationship (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and
McConnell and Servaes (1990)). Recall that this negative relationship was the basis for the early
literature's conclusion that managerial entrenchment and overinvestment are important features
of large corporations. Our results, using more comprehensive data and including fixed effects, do
not support this conclusion.
The second feature is that at all levels of incentives, greater incentives are associated with
higher firm performance as measured by Tobin's Q.Todate, there has been no general finding
that performance is increasing in incentives. Our result contrasts with Himmelberg, Hubbard, and
Palia (1999), who found essentially no relationship between Tobin's Qandmanagerial ownership
in a fixed effects specification. Although they do not draw this conclusion, their results reject
standard principal-agent models such as Holmstrom (1979) and Holrnstrom and Milgrom (1987),
which predict that performance will be increasing in incentives in equilibrium. Our finding of
a positive relationship may therefore be viewed as support for standard principal-agent models,
quite apart from the implications of this result for our models of over- or underinvestment.
We can also conclude from our estimate of a positive relationship that the underlying source
of variation, both within and across firms, is risk aversion or the variance of firm performance
21(see Table 1).If risk aversion or variance decreases, then shareholders will increase incentives
provided to managers. Greater incentives reduce the agency problem due to private costs or
benefits of investment and thereby increase firm performance.In contrast, if the underlying
source of variation were the magnitude of private costs or benefits, then higher incentives would
reflect an attempt to offset the higher private benefits or costs. Higher private benefits or costs
lower firm performance. Based on the positive relationship between performance and incentives,
we conclude that any variations in the magnitude of B are small in comparison with the variation
in risk aversion or the variance of firm performance.
4.2 Investment and Incentives—Initial Results
Our results on the relationship between Tobin's Q and managerial incentives enable us to identify
the underlying source of variation but not the nature of the agency problem—private benefits or
private costs. As shown in Table 1, we must also consider the relationship between investment
and incentives in order to identify which model is generating the data. We estimate an analogous
spline regression for investment:
(I/K) =$0 +$1PPS1 + fl2PPS2 + $3PPS3 + $4PPS4 + G + A + E.(19)
t=94
Inthis equation, the dependent variable is firm investment divided by capital. Both investment
and capital are defined in terms of net property, plant, and equipment. As in the Q regression,
the PPS terms reflect the slopes of the segments in each of the four quartiles of the data, theyear
effects are denoted by O, and the firm level fixed effects are
Table 4 presents the results of the OLS and fixed effect estimates of the coefficients in equation
(19). In the OLS regression, shown in the first column, the coefficients on the first three PPS
terms are positive and significantly different from zero at the one percent level.The fourth
PPS term, corresponding to the slope of the top segment, is negative and significant. However,
as in the regressions for Tobin's Q in Table 3, the magnitude of the top segment's coefficient is
extremely small and reflects an essentially fiat relationship between investment and incentives.
The fixed effect results in the second column show a different pattern. In this regression, the
slopes of the first two segments are positive but insignificant. The slope of the third segment
is negative but extremely small and statistically insignificant. The slope of the topsegment is
22positive and statistically significant at the one percent level. The test for the joint significance
of the four PPS terms rejects the null hypothesis that all coefficients are zero with a p-value of
0.0228. The PPS terms have significant explanatory power for investment. The p-value for the
test that the coefficients on all four PPS terms are equal to each other is 0.6416, indicating that a
linear specification would capture the relationship between investment and managerial incentives
as well as the spline does. The predicted values for both regressions are graphed in Figure 2 using
the intercepts for the 1993 sample year. Figure 2 shows that the relationship between investment
and incentives is positive.
Combined with the positive slope of the relationship between Tobin's Q and incentives, the
finding that investment is increasing in incentives allows us to identify which model, private costs
or benefits of investment, is generating the data. Table 1 shows that if investment and firm
performance move in the same direction when incentives change, then the model must be one
of private costs of investment. The reason is intuitive: if risk aversion or the variance of firm
performance declines, so that it is less expensive to compensate the manager through incentives,
then shareholders will take advantage of the opportunity to increase incentives, thereby increasing
investment toward its optimal level (in the absence of an agency problem) and raising the value of
the firm. Our results do not support a model of overinvestment. If overinvestment were a feature
of the data, then increases in firm performance associated with increases in incentives would also
be associated with lower, not higher, levels of investment.
To summarize our results, we can uniquely identify the model that generates the data from the
alternatives in the four cells of Table 1 based on two findings. Because the equilibrium values of
Tobin's Q and investment move together in response to changes in incentives, the model must be
one of private costs rather than private benefits of investment. Because this direction is positive,
the underlying source of variation across the equilibrium outcomes must be risk aversion or the
variance of firm performance rather than the magnitude of the private costs of investment.
4.3 Additional Specifications
Our initial regressions in Tables 3 and 4 focus on the relationships between managerial incentives
and both Tobin's Q and investment. In principle, there may be other determinants of investment
and firm performance that are not explicitly related to managerial incentives. The inclusion of
23fixed effects and year effects controls for a substantial amount of variation in these other factors.
Firm-specific factors that do not vary over time are absorbed by the fixed effects. Firm-specific
factors that change linearly over time are absorbed by the combination of the fixed effects and the
year effects. Economy-wide factors that affect all firms equally but vary over time are absorbed
by the year effects.
To futher demonstrate the robustness of our initial estimates, we augment our fixed effects
specifications to include potential determinants of Tobin's Qandinvestment that vary both across
firms and within firms over time. We use the full set of covariates described in Table 2 to estimate
the following two regressions:
=/3+ /91PPS1ft + $2PPS2 + $3PPS3 + !34PPS4 (20)
+ >at+ A
k=1 t=94
(I/K) =fib+ fi1PPSL + fi2PPS2 + /33PPS3 + fi4PPS41 (21)
+ 8kX +Ut + A + Ej.
k=1 t=94
In these regressions, the other covariates are denoted by 4.Theresults are presented in Table
5.
The inclusion of the additional covarmates does not change the pattern of the coefficients on
the PPS terms in either regression. In the regression for Tobin's Q,allslopes are estimated to be
positive and are somewhat smaller than the estimates in Table 3. The p-values for the statistical
significance of the slope of each segment are 0.030, 0.058, 0.146, and 0.058. The p-value for their
joint significance is 0.0001. In the regression for investment with the additional covariates, the
estimated coefficient for the slope of the top segment is 0.0027 with a standard error of 0.0010.
These match the coefficient and significance of the top segment in Table 4, which did not control
for the additional covariates. The estimated coefficients for the bottom three slopes are slightly
lower and of comparable significance to those in Table 4. The p-value for the joint significance of
the FF8 terms is now 0.0323. The p-value for the equality of the FF8 coefficients is 0.6010, again
suggesting a linear specification would be sufficient to capture the relationship between incentives
and investment.
24For the additional covariates, we find that greater variance of returns is associated with lower
values of Tobin's Q and investment. All of the other variables in the investment regression are
insignificant, including cash flow and leverage, which are often cited as determinants of investment.
In the regressions for Tobin's Q, there are several significant results. Firm size, as measured by
the logarithm of sales, has a decreasing then increasing effect on Tobin's Q. The same is true for
the ratio of capital to sales. Higher leverage is associated with lower values of Tobin's Q. This
result contradicts hypotheses that greater leverage improves firm performance, as in other private
benefits models such as Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990),Hartand Moore (1995), and Zwiebel (1996).
Firms with more advertising expenditures tend to have lower values of Tobin's Q. Dividend yield
is not significantly related to either investment or Tobin's Q.
These regressions show that the increasing relationships between incentives and both firm
performance and investment are robust features of the data. As an alternative specification, in




(I/K)1 =fib+ fia + 5kx + O + A1 +&. (23)
1=1 1=94
Ineffect, we are imposing the constraints that fi == fi=fiin our original spline specifica-
tions.
For both Tobin's Q and investment, the coefficient on managerial incentives is positive and
statistically significant. For Tobin's Q, the magnitude of the coefficient on incentives, 0.0121, is
intermediate between the slopes of the third and fourth segments of the spline regression estimates
in Table 5. For investment, the magnitude of the coefficient on incentives is very similar to that
of the top segment in Table 5. In the linear specifications, both firm performance and investment
are increasing in incentives, as predicted by the private costs of investment model.
4.4 Discussion
The results of our empirical estimates suggest a positive, concave relationship between Tobin's Q
and incentives and a positive, linear relationship between investment and incentives. Based on
the theoretical predictions detailed in Table 1, these results support a model in which managers
25face private costs of investment (B< 0)and the underlying source of variation across equilibrium
outcomes is risk aversion or the variance of firm performance. The private costs model predicts
that we will observe underinvestment.
Our results reject principal-agent models based on private benefits of investment (empire-
building, managerial entrenchment, perquisites consumption). Both investment and firm perfor-
mance move in the same direction in response to changes in incentives, not in opposite directions.
We also show that earlier empirical findings, based solely on the relationship between firm per-
formance and managerial ownership, are insufficient to identify whether the agency problem is
one of private costs or private benefits of investment. 'While there is surely anecdotal evidence
of overinvestment problems at individual firms, our results suggest that they are not, on average,
significant problems at a broad cross-section of U.S. corporations.
Overinvestment problems have received extensive attention, starting with Jensen's (1986) dis-
cussion of overinvestment due to free cash flow. Jensen suggests that debt, dividends, takeovers,
and board monitoring could all serve as mechanisms to curtail overinvestment. Our private
benefits model shows that managerial incentives can serve the same purpose. Mechanisms such
as takeovers and board intervention require substantial, disruptive change. Given the relative
ease with which incentives from compensation can be adjusted, the compensation contract is the
natural mechanism to alleviate agency problems.
Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that these alternative mechanisms are not effective.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (1998) show that takeover activity has decreased markedly in response
to antitakeover legislation. They also show that compensation incentives have partially offset the
reduction in incentives from takeovers. Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) suggest that boards,
and in particular larger boards, are ineffective at raising firm value. In our regressions from
Tables 5 and 6, we include both debt and dividends as explanatory variables. The coefficients on
dividends are insignificant in the regressions for both firm performance and investment. Although
the coefficient on debt is negative and significant in the investment regression, the coefficient is also
negative and significant in the Tobin's Qregression.This is inconsistent with debt constraining
overinvestment problems,
In principle, our empirical results on underinvestment could be explained by factors other than
26the principal-agent concerns discussed here. To take one example, suppose that managers have
private information about their own firms' quality. Then, in a dividend signaling model (Miller
and Rock (1985)), managers will cut investment to pay a dividend that signals their firms' quality.
In the Miller and Rock model, managers care about both the fundamental value of the firm and
the short-term stock price. The higher dividend increases the short-term stock price. If greater
management incentives cause managers to put greater weight on the fundamental value of the
firm, then managers will be less inclined to signal. Investment will increase (underinvestment
will decrease) and firm performance (fundamental value) wifi increase. As in our private costs
model, greater incentives are associated with higher investment and higher firm performance. It
is worth noting that, empirically, we find that both firm performance and investment are unrelated
to dividends. Further, controlling for dividends, greater incentives are associated with higher firm
performance and investment. These results cast doubt on the dividend signaling explanation.
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a, b) provide further support for the general principal-agent
framework by showing that incentives are declining in the variance of firm returns. While the
dividend signaling model and other alternative explanations may predict underinvestment, they do
not explain why incentives are declining in the variance of firm returns. Such a finding requires an
incentives-insurance tradeoff. Our private costs model can reconcile all three empirical findings:
investment is increasing in incentives; firm performance is increasing in incentives; and incentives
are decreasing in the variance of firm returns.
Other models of the incentives-insurance tradeoff are also consistent with some of our findings.
In the Holrnstrom and Milgrom (1987) model, managers take actions such as exerting effort rather
than choosing the level of investment. In equilibrium, firm performance is increasing in the level
of incentives and incentives are decreasing in the variance of firm performance. Their model is not
designed to study the relationship between investment and incentives. However, the interpretation
of our underinvestment model is similar to that of their model if the private costs of investment
come from managers needing to exert effort to monitor investment. Our three findings provide
strong support for principal-agent models in which shareholders provide incentives for managers
to choose higher values of the action, whether investment or effort. Although the Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1987) model generates similar predictions to those of our underinvestment model, their
27model is not sufficient to study overinvestment problems, which is the other main focus of our
study.
5. Conclusion
We examine how the separation of ownership and control affects investment and firm performance.
We consider two variants of the principal-agent problem. In the first variant, managers have
private benefits of investment and therefore overinvest. In the second variant, managers have
private costs of investment and therefore underinvest. We show how compensation contracts will
be designed to ameliorate over- or underinvestment problems. Given the optimal contracts we
derive, we then test several implications of the theory.
For all specifications, we find that both investment and firm performance are increasing in
incentives. These results are consistent with the presence of private costs and underinvestment.
These results also suggest that the primary differences within and across firms are in risk aversion
or the variance of firm performance. In our framework, incentives are an endogenous variable
and our tests are based on the equilibrium predictions of the model. Increases in incentives come
from decreases in risk aversion or the variance of firm performance. The equilibrium increase
in incentives then yields higher investment and better performance. Without any change in the
underlying exogenous variables (risk aversion, variance), an increase in incentives would lower net
returns to shareholders and is therefore not optimal.
Overall, we find little support for the idea that managers systematically overinvest. Our main
empirical contribution to the literature is to demonstrate that investment and performance increase
in response to increases in incentives. The implications of this result are straightforward. How
can there be an overinvestment problem due to agency concerns if greater incentives—the cure for
agency concerns—results in greater investment arid better firm performance? We find support
for the idea that managers underinvest. To the extent that they do, the positive relationship
between investment and incentives suggests that contracts are structured to address this problem.
Therefore, our results support the idea that contracts are set in equilibrium to optimally address
shirking problems in firms.
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Sign of Sign of
t/aa IIJa
Risk Aversion (r) or
Variance of Returns (&)+ — + +
Private Benefit or Cost
of Investment (B)
— + — —
Notes:
1) Each cell in the table represents the predicted sign of the change in profits or
investment when managerial incentives change.
2) Each row specifies a different underlying (exogenous) parameter of the model in
Section 2 that could be changing to generate the shifts in equilibrium incentives (a),
investment (I), and profits (it).








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Regressions ofTobin's QonTop Management Incentives, by Estimation Method
Variable OLS Fixed Effect
Intercept 1.4846 1.6590
(0.0499) (0.0680)


































P-value for PPS terms:
Joint Significance 0.0000 0.0000
Equality 0.0000 0.0000
Each regression pertains to our sample of 1494 firms and 5665 firm-years.
The Fixed Effects specification includes a dummy variable for each sample firm.





























































P-value for PPS terms:
Joint Significance 0.0000 0.0228
Equality 0.0000 0.6416
Notes
1) Each regression pertains to our sample of 1494 firms and 5665 firm-years.
2) The Fixed Effects specification includes a dummy variable for each sample firm.Table 5
Fixed Effect Regressions ofTobin QandInvestment on Incentives, Spline Terms































































P-value for PPS terms:
Joint Significance 0.0001 0.0323
Equality 0.0222 0.6010
Notes
1) Each regression pertains to our sample of 1494 firms and 5665 firm-years.
2) Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses beneath each
coefficient.
































Regressions ofTobin QandInvestment on
Dep. Variable Is Tobin Q
Incentives, Linear Term




















































1) Each regression pertains to our sample of 1494 firms and 5665 firm-years.
2) Heteroskedasticityrobust standard errors are reported in parentheses beneath each
coefficient.
3) Each regression also includes year effects (not reported).
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